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Abstract
This paper investigates the heterogeneity of ethnic employment gaps us-
ing a new single-index based approach. Instead of stratifying our sample
by age or education, we study ethnic employment gaps along a continu-
ous measure of employability, the employment probability minority workers
would have if their characteristics were priced as in the majority group.
We apply this method to French males, comparing those whose parents are
North African immigrants and those with native parents. We find that both
the raw and the unexplained ethnic employment differentials are larger for
low-employability workers than for high-employability ones. We show in
a theoretical framework that this heterogeneity can be accounted for by
homogeneous underlying mechanisms and is not evidence for, say, hetero-
geneous discrimination. Finally, we discuss our main empirical findings in
the light of simple taste-based vs. statistical discrimination models.
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1 Introduction
In the United States as well as in Europe, there exist large ethnic differentials in
wages and employment rates (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Algan, Dustmann, Glitz,
and Manning, 2010). If the ethnic gaps in wages are large in magnitude, a ma-
jor part of these can be explained by differentials in workers’ characteristics.1 In
contrast, a large part of ethnic employment gaps remains unexplained by skill dif-
ferentials, as stressed by Ritter and Taylor (2011). In the French case, Aeberhardt,
Fouge`re, Pouget, and Rathelot (2010) study ethnic wage gaps between French in-
dividuals of African origin and French individual of French origin correcting for
employment selection. They find that a detailed description of the latest obtained
degree, together with age, accounts for the entire wage gap, but only for a third of
the unemployment gap. Despite these empirical facts, both empirical and theoret-
ical literatures dealing with ethnic differentials on the labor market have focused
on wage gaps and the issue of employment gaps has been relatively neglected (see
Charles and Guryan, 2011; Lang and Lehmann, 2011).2
This paper aims to develop a new empirical framework to study the heterogeneity
of ethnic employment gaps, and provides results using French data. While average
measures give a broad picture of labor market differentials, studying their hetero-
geneity is interesting for two reasons. First, policy-makers may be interested in
identifying who are the subgroups suffering from the highest gaps on the labor
market. Second, because the economic phenomena underlying these differentials
have not yet been entirely understood, obtaining new empirical facts may shed a
new light on existing theoretical models and foster theoretical innovation. As it is
the case for average measures, the heterogeneity of ethnic differentials on the labor
market has mostly been studied on the wage dimension. Several empirical papers
focus on sub-populations, high-skill (Black, Haviland, Sanders, and Taylor, 2006,
2008; Bjerk, 2007) or low-skill workers (Chandra, 2000): ethnic wage gaps tend
to be smaller for high-skill workers.3 Much less attention has been paid to ethnic
1Neal and Johnson (1996) stress the roles of verbal and mathematical skills and Black, Havi-
land, Sanders, and Taylor (2006) those of detailed degrees and fields of specialization for highly
educated workers.See also Lang and Manove (2011) for a discussion.
2Notable counter-examples include Flanagan (1976), Abowd and Killingsworth (1984), Cain
and Finnie (1990), Welch (1990), Bound and Freeman (1992), Stratton (1993), Darity and Mason
(1998), Fairlie and Sundstrom (1999) or Couch and Fairlie (2010).
3Other papers make use of the decomposition technique developed in (Fortin, Lemieux,
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employment differentials. To our knowledge, Johnson and Neal (1998) is the only
contribution in which ethnic employment gaps are stratified according to individ-
ual skills: they find that “a college degree has a greater effect on the employment
opportunities of Black workers”, which means that lower ethnic employment gaps
are expected among college graduates.
Figure 1 reports the raw employment gaps between French men with North African
parents and French men with French parents, by level of education (left) and by
age (right) and provides some preliminary evidence about the heterogeneity of
ethnic employment gaps. There are large differences with respect to education:
highly educated workers experience lower employment gaps than less-educated
ones. The gap also looks slightly lower for middle-aged workers.
Figure 1: Ethnic employment gap by education (left) and age (right) for male
workers
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: Raw difference between the employment rates in the majority and the minor-
ity groups, within each age or education subsample. Confidence intervals with 95%
coverage level are reported in brackets.
Pushing the analysis beyond a few subgroups is difficult. As the number of sub-
and Firpo, 2011): Heywood and Parent (2012) focus on performance pay jobs and show that
Black/White wage differentials grow with earnings, whereas in non-performance pay jobs, those
differentials go to zero.
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groups increases, the precision of the results drops. Our approach is to sum up all
the relevant covariates into a single index. We estimate a model of employment on
the majority population and use parameter estimates to predict for all individuals
a continuous measure of employability, which is the employment probability as
predicted from a worker’s characteristics if those were valued as in the majority
group. Then, we study the ethnic employment gaps along this score, comparing
majority and minority workers with similar employability. The approach relies on
a conditional independence assumption (CIA), which amounts to assuming that
majority and minority workers do not have systematic different unobservable de-
terminants of employment. As far as we know, the approach we propose is new.
Studies in the treatment effect literature usually analyze treatment heterogeneity
along treatment probability (i.e. propensity score) or use subgroup analyses (i.e.
along one-dimensional X). Our approach is in contrast related to the growing
interest on studying heterogeneous treatment effects across other dimensions. An-
other contribution of this text is to study transitions into and from employment
along employability.
Applying this approach to French men with North African and native origins,
we document that the unexplained employment gap is large for workers with low
employability and decreases with employability. We decompose this gap between
hiring and exit gaps and find that both play important roles in explaining the
employment gap, but exit gaps seem to matter more than hiring gaps for most of
workers. We also document that the ratio of exit rates between the minority and
the majority seems to be clearly constant along the employability score. For the
ratio of hiring rates, point estimates suggest that the hiring rate ratio increases
for low levels of employability and then decreases for higher ones but we cannot
statistically reject that it is in fact constant.
Finally, we interpret these empirical results in light of theory. A simple inflow-
outflow model shows that, even when hiring and exit rate ratios are constant,
employment gaps can be heterogeneous. Then, we investigate which hiring dis-
crimination mechanisms may help us in explaining our empirical findings. Our
ambition is purely illustrative and we do not pretend to provide formal tests
about which discrimination types are at stake. We develop a screening model in
a taste-based vs. a statistical discrimination framework. We find that the shape
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of the hiring rate ratio curve found in the empirical part is easiest to reconcile
with a model of statistical discrimination where minority applicants have a noisier
signal than majority ones. In a last theoretical part, we provide two frameworks
in which exit rates can differ across ethnic groups. Adding a second signal draw
while the worker is on the job can generate ethnic gaps in exit rates in the case of
statistical discrimination. Alternatively, a search model with risk-averse workers
predicts that minority workers are more likely to accept jobs with higher exit rates.
Our study is related to a recent literature that aims at understanding the channels
underlying ethnic differentials in France. The results obtained by Toˆ (2014) on
the heterogeneity of the ethnic wage gap suggest the existence of statistical dis-
crimination.4 In contrast, Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2014) provide evidence that
anti-Muslim discrimination in France is at least partly taste-based, and Combes,
Decreuse, Laoue´nan, and Trannoy (2014) find evidence in favor of customer dis-
crimination against African immigrants. Finally, using a correspondence study,
Edo, Jacquemet, and Yannelis (2014) find that large unexplained gaps remain in
hiring probabilities once statistical discrimination related to language ability is
accounted for.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the French
Labor Force Survey (LFS) from 2005 to 2011, as well as some summary statistics.
In Section 3, we introduce the empirical methodology. Section 4 provides the main
empirical results, which evidence the heterogeneity of the ethnic employment gap.
In Section 5, we discuss our empirical findings in the light of classical theoretical
frameworks.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
The analysis is conducted using the French Labor Force Survey (LFS), undertaken
by INSEE. We use the data collected from 2005Q1 to 2011Q4 as, since 2005 only,
the LFS contains information on the parents’ nationalities at birth and countries
of birth. The children of immigrants from a given country can therefore be iden-
tified as well as their parents’ nationality at birth, and parents’ country of birth.
4Gobillon, Meurs, and Roux (2015) develop a different method to account for observables in
the analysis of wage gaps along the distribution of wages, which could be applied to ethnic gaps.
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The LFS also contains a precise description of the individual status on the labor
market as well as information on socio-demographic characteristics – age, gender,
qualification, family characteristics. Around 70,000 individuals aged more than
15 are interviewed each quarter for six quarters in a row.
As we wish to focus on labor-demand issues, we only keep males aged 15 to 50
who are not students. The minority population, denoted population D, contains
3,626 French men aged 15-50, born in France, with at least one parent born with
the citizenship of a North African country. The majority population, denoted
population F , contains 79,055 French men aged 15-50 whose both parents were
born French in France. Employment status corresponding to the ILO definition
is reported in the LFS: an individual is considered as working if he worked at
least one hour during the week. The empirical analysis will first consider as the
outcome the employment status: for this part of the analysis, we only keep the
first observation of each individual. Then, we examine quarterly transitions into
and from employment. For this second part, we use all observations (there is a
maximum of six) available for each individual.
The human-capital attributes observed in the data are the age (or the potential
experience) and education. Ability measures, such as IQ or AFQT scores, are not
available in this dataset. However, education is described in a precise way: both
the level and the field of the highest degree obtained are provided. We build 20
categories of education combining the highest degree’s level and major (see Table
1). We also rely on parents’ occupations or former occupations, which are likely
to be correlated with some dimensions of unobserved ability.5
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for both groups. First, minority workers
are less educated: they are less likely to have reached the highest qualifications
(for instance, 2% vs. 5% with a degree from a Grande E´cole) and more likely
to have no qualification at all (29% vs. 15%). They are also younger (49% less
than 30 years old vs. 33%). Second, they experience more difficulties on the
labor market. They are less often employed (64% vs. 87%) and much more likely
not to have ever worked (18% vs. 7%). Those who work are about twice less
likely to be executive or professional and are also less likely to occupy technical
5See 3.4 for a discussion on the choice of the covariates.
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or educational occupations (16% vs. 21%). Finally, minority individuals come
from less advantaged backgrounds. Their fathers were more often blue-collars,
less often professionals, technicians or office workers, than those of the majority.
Their mothers did not work at all more often.
[Insert here Table 1]
Table 2 reports the estimation results of a logit model of employment on the ma-
jority group. Age and education are included in the model in a detailed way, and
are interacted. We also include the parents’ current occupations (or former for
those who are retired) to control for family backgrounds.
Covariates related to family situation are excluded, as their endogeneity might
bias the results.6 Estimates on age and education have the expected signs. The
employment probability increases steadily from the 15-25 to the 45-50 categories.
Terciary education degrees (either general, vocational or technical) and vocational
upper secondary (high school) degrees increase the employment probability with
respect to a general upper secondary (high-school) degree in Humanities. Having
no degree at all is, as expected, significantly less favorable than having completed
high school. The coefficients of the interaction between being aged 15-35 and the
degree hold, which are introduced to capture potential changes of the labor-market
values of some degrees over time, are mostly insignificant.
[Insert here Table 2]
We carry out the comparison of groups D and F by performing a classical de-
composition of the mean of the employment differential a` la Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973). The average employment rate in the majority population is 87%
while it is equal to 64% in the minority population. In this decomposition as well
as in the remainder of the text, we consider the majority group as the reference
group. Using the returns estimated on population F , the counterfactual mean
employment probability for population D is equal to 81%. The raw gap of 22
percentage points (pp.) can then be decomposed into two parts: 6.5 pp. (30%)
are explained by the differences in observable characteristics while 15.5 pp. (70%)
6We tried to introduce them in alternative specifications and results were not qualitatively
affected.
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are not.
Using the same specification, we can repeat the exercise by subgroup defined
either by the highest degree achieved or by age (Figure 2). Compared to Figure
1, Figure 2 adds a decomposition with respect to observables (parental socio-
economic backgroup as well as remaining heterogeneity in education and age).
We find that ethnic employment differentials are not homogeneous and vary by
age and education. More educated and middle-aged groups seem to experience a
lower employment gap, both in raw terms and after controlling for differences in
observable characteristics.
Figure 2: Explained and unexplained components of the ethnic employment gap
by education (left) and age (right)
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: The decomposition of employment gaps into explained and unexplained is based
on Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, using parental socio-economic background, age and
education as workers’ characteristics. Confidence intervals with 95% coverage level for
the explained part of the gap are reported in brackets.
In Figure 3, each dot represents an age × education cell. The position of the dot
on the x-axis is given by the employment rate of the individuals of group F whose
characteristics belong to the cell, while the position on the y-axis is given by the
mean employment of individuals of group D that belong to the cell. The points to
the right of the figure correspond to more experienced and more educated individ-
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uals who have a higher probability of employment. The overall message is that, for
subgroups characterised by higher levels of employment, the ethnic employment
gap is lower.
Figure 3: Employment rates in the population with North African parents
with respect to employment rates in the population with French parents, per
education×age cells
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: Education is given by the last obtained degree (in 8 positions) while age
is given in 6 positions, for a total of 48 cells.
One drawback of this figure is that cutting the sample into subgroups increases
the noise within each cell.7 The following section presents a statistical framework
to study the heterogeneity of employment gaps and introduces a new single-index-
based method that allows us to obtain results that are less affected by noise.
3 Methodology
3.1 Discrimination in a potential outcome framework
We use the potential outcome model of Rubin (1974). Let Yi be a binary outcome
variable, here, the employment status, and Xi the characteristics of individual i.
7To maintain a sufficient number of observations per cell in Figure 3, the education covariate
was grouped into 8 positions instead of 21.
8
We want to understand how the binary variable Ti affects the binary outcome Yi.
In our case, T denotes the population group: Ti = F if individual i comes from
group F , the majority population, and Ti = D if individual i comes from the
minority group D. Yi(F ) and Yi(D) are the two potential outcomes of individual
i whether i comes from population F or D, and we are interested in the difference
between both outcomes. Unfortunately, only Yi = TiYi(D) + (1− Ti)Yi(F ) is ob-
served.
The usual decomposition-of-the-mean approach (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) con-
sists in estimating E(Yi(F )|Xi) on population F (for instance with a probit or logit
model) and using the return estimates to predict E(E(Yi(F )|Xi, D)|D) on popu-
lation D. The other terms, E(E(Yi(F )|Xi, F )|F ) and E(E(Yi(D)|Xi, D)|D) are
directly estimated by the corresponding empirical means in populations F and D.
This decomposition can be interpreted when there is no difference between the
minority and the majority populations in unobservable abilities correlated with
the outcome once conditioned on observables. This conditional independence as-
sumption (CIA) can be stated as Yi(F ) ⊥ Ti|Xi, ∀i. Whether they explicitly state
it or not, all studies which deal with wage or employment differentials between
groups have to rely on such an ignorability assumption, conditional on observable
characteristics.
With this assumption, a natural way to study the heterogeneity of employment
gaps is to study E(Yi(F )|Xi = x,D) − E(Yi(D)|Xi = x,D),∀x, which is called
the conditional average treatment effect, see e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
Under the CIA, the first term of this difference is equal to E(Yi|Xi = x, F ) and
can be estimated on population F .8 Figure 3 provides an empirical counterpart
of E(Yi(D)|Xi, D) as a function of E(Yi(F )|Xi, D), where X contains age and ed-
ucation. In other terms, the graph shows the observed probability of employment
in population D versus its counterfactual value if the same individuals belonged
to population F . The above difference corresponds to the gap between the points
and the line of equation y = x. According to this figure, E(Yi(D)|Xi, D) and
E(Yi(F )|Xi, D) are very close for characteristics associated with high employment
probability. Although this approach is theoretically sufficient to study the hetero-
8See also Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) for an extensive discussion about the interpre-
tation of decomposition methods under the CIA.
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geneity of employment gaps, the credibility of the CIA often requires to include a
large number of covariates in the model.
As more covariates are included, the number of individuals by cell rapidly decreases
and the preceding approach leads to very imprecise conditional gap estimates be-
tween groups. The usual solution was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
and consists in conditioning on the propensity score rather than on the full set of
covariates. Studying the heterogeneity of the treatment effect along the propensity
score makes sense in cases when individuals select themselves into the treatment
(based on some unobservables) as one may expect then that two individuals with
similar scores would benefit from the treatment in similar proportions.
3.2 Employment gaps along the employability score
A more natural dimension to study the heterogeneity of the ethnic employment
gap is the outcome probability line eF (X) = P (Y (F ) = 1|X), that we hereafter
call for simplicity the employability score. Worker i’s employability score is equal
to eFi = P (Yi(F ) = 1|Xi), where i’s characteristics are priced as in the reference
population F . Employability score is a single-index-based measure that sums up
all X in one dimension. One can interpret the employability as a measure for the
workers’ proximity to employment when individual characteristics are valued as
in the majority group.
Our theoretical contribution is actually more general. We show that in case of a
binary outcome and under the CIA, the outcome probability score (employability)
provides, as the propensity score, a unidimensional score that summarizes the CIA
(see proof A.1 in the Appendix):
Y (F ) ⊥ T |X, ∀i⇒ Y (F ) ⊥ T |eF (X), ∀i
which entails
E(Y (F )|eF , D)− E(Y (D)|eF , D) = E(Y |eF , F )− E(Y |eF , D), ∀i
This provides a statistical justification for the choice of the employability as the
conditioning variable.9
9One may also note that the information about the heterogeneity of treatment along the
employability score is not redundant with the one along the propensity score. See Appendix B
for a discussion of similarities and differences between the propensity and employability scores.
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Note that our approach is related to the growing interest on studying hetero-
geneous treatment effects across other dimensions. Athey and Imbens (2015),
amongst others, apply machine learning methods to determine the sub-groups
(and the x) for whom the treatment has the strongest effects, and enhance het-
erogeneous treatment estimation. As reviewed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009),
Dehejia (2005), Manski (2000, 2002, 2004), Hirano and Porter (2005) develop
decision-making approaches in which administrators of programs decide to assign
new individuals to a treatment or a control groups based on how much the latter
are likely to benefit from the program given some prior information.
3.3 Estimation in practice
The first step consists in estimating employability score eF = P (Y (F ) = 1|X) as
a function of the observables, using the logit model presented in section 2. In a
second step, we compute the employability score of each individual of population
D: eFi = P (Yi(F ) = 1|Xi). The third step consists in estimating E(Y (D)|eF ),
which is a function of eF , for the whole range of values taken by eF in the ethnic
minority. Because eF is continuous, E(Y (D)|eF ) is estimated using smoothing
methods: we use cubic splines and check that the main results hold when other
methods (splines with other degrees of freedom, lowess, kernel smoothing) are
used.10
3.4 Should we believe in the CIA in our case?
A potential limitation of decomposition methods like the one used here is their
reliance on the CIA. We have to assume that there are no ethnic differentials in
unobserved determinants of employment once we condition on detailed measures
of age, education and parents’ occupation.
This assumption is questionable if some dimensions of employability are not ac-
counted for by the covariates included in the analysis. Immigrants could indeed
have lower-quality social networks, which would be detrimental to the hiring of
10Xie, Brand, and Jann (2012) also use a nonparametric method to estimate heterogeneous
treatment effects. They match control units to treated ones based on the propensity score and
then estimate treatment effects as a function of the propensity score by fitting a non-parametric
model.
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their children. Further, minority workers may have more difficulties to signal their
skills than majority workers.11 While we cannot reject this possibility, it is worth
noting that children of migrants from Southern Europe, who have socio-economic
backgrounds comparable to North-African migrants, do not suffer from any dif-
ferential on the labor market, once education and age are taken into account
(Rathelot, 2014).
Some papers have also argued that ethnic groups may have different labor-supply
behaviors for cultural reasons, as evidenced for females in the U.S. by Fernan-
dez and Fogli (2009). In the case of France, decomposing employment gaps for
females provide results that are similar to those on males (Aeberhardt and Rath-
elot, 2013). If cultural transmission were a substantial driver of the employment,
we would have expected to see much larger raw and unexplained gaps for females.
One strand of the literature has attempted to deal with these issues by includ-
ing some kind of IQ measure among covariates (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Lang
and Manove, 2011). Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo (2010) use alternatively the
AFQT at 12 and the father’s education as measures of unobserved ability when
explaining ethnic wage gaps of college and high-school graduates in the U.S. and
find similar results with both measures.12 In our data, there is no IQ measure
but we observe both parents’ occupations. While we have no evidence that the
result obtained by Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo (2010) would hold in the case
of France, we expect that including parents’ occupations will mitigate potential
deviations to the CIA.
In the case of France, Aeberhardt, Fouge`re, Pouget, and Rathelot (2010) show
that controlling for the same covariates as the ones we use in this study explains
the entire ethnic wage gap (but not the employment gap), even when selection
issues are accounted for. This result can be considered as additional suggestive
evidence that the covariates used here can do a decent job making the CIA hold.
11Note that ethnic gaps in skill-signalling quality are likely to be larger for low-skill workers
(lower employability), than for high-skill workers (higher employability), see Arcidiacono, Bayer,
and Hizmo (2010)
12See also Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2009) for evidence on inter-generational transmis-
sion of IQ scores.
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4 Empirical findings
4.1 The ethnic employment gap along employability
Figure 4 displays the estimate of E(Y (D)|eF ), where the employability eF (X) is
estimated using the specification detailed in Table 2. The ethnic gap can be read
as the difference between the curve and the 45-degree line in the left panel, and
is directly shown as eF − E(Y (D)|eF ) in the right panel. This gap can be inter-
preted as net of composition effects: under the CIA, it is the unexplained/residual
gap that remains once differences in observables have been accounted for. From
Figure 4, we note that the unexplained employment gap is sizable for most indi-
viduals of the minority population. The overall pattern is hump-shaped with lower
gaps for both very high and lower employability. While the pattern of the point
estimates looks broadly increasing when the employability score is lower than .5,
confidence intervals are too large to allow us to be too assertive. Between .6 and
.8, the gap is roughly stable, between 15 and 20 percentage points. For workers
with employability scores above .8, the gap frankly decreases with employabil-
ity (Finding 1). This concerns half of the minority workers and three majority
workers out of four, see Figure 5, which reports the distribution of minority and
majority workers along the employability line. For employability scores above .95,
the point estimate of the employment gap becomes small in magnitude (below 5
percentage points) and insignificant, although the confidence intervals are also too
large to allow us to conclude that the gap converges to zero.
4.2 Ethnic differentials in the flows from and into employ-
ment
Differences in employment rates can be linked to differences in the hiring rates
or in the exit rates. In this section, we analyze the levels of ethnic differentials
regarding inflow and outflow rates and their heterogeneity along the employability
score.
The share of employed people moving quarterly out of employment is quite low:
2.7% in the majority group. The raw ethnic gap in the outflow rate is relatively
high, 4 percentage points, which means that the exit rate is overall 3 times higher
in the minority than in the majority group. The unexplained gap is still quite sub-
13
Figure 4: Average employment probability for the individuals with North African
parents and unexplained employment gap, as a function of the employability score.
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: Predicted employment probabilities are based on the estimation of a logit on the
majority population. The employment probability in the minority group is smoothed
using cubic splines with 7 degrees of freedom.
stantial, around 2.5 percentage points. The share of non-employed people moving
quarterly into employment is equal to 19.8% in the majority group and is 7.2
percentage points lower in the minority group. The unexplained gap is around 5
percentage points.
Figure 6 displays how the transition rates from and into employment vary with
employability. As suggested by the average results, there are sizable ethnic differ-
entials in both the hiring and the exit rates, at least when employability exceeds
.5 for hiring rates, and when it remains below .95 for exit rates.
Overall, for both groups, the hiring rates are increasing with employability while
the exit rates are decreasing. We now examine the ratios of hiring/exit rates
between the two groups. Figure 7 replicates Figure 6 with rescaled majority rates
to ease comparisons with minority ones: in the left panel the majority hiring rate
is divided by 1.5, in the right panel, the majority exit rate is multiplied by 1.6.
Although we cannot statistically reject that it is constant along the employability
score, the general shape of the curve given by point estimates suggests that, if
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Figure 5: Distribution of the employability score in both groups: empirical prob-
ability and cumulative distribution functions
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: The employability score is based on the estimation of a logit on the majority
population.
anything, the hiring rates ratio may increase up to an employability score of .8 and
may decrease above (Finding 2) Results are more clear-cut concerning the exit
rates ratio. The ratio between the minority and the majority exit rates appears
to be constant with employability (Finding 3).
4.3 The contributions of inflows and outflows to employ-
ment gaps
Are the results on the flows consistent with the ones on the employment rates? In
order to answer this question, we have to add some structure to the data. Suppose
that individuals, given their characteristics, have a specific hiring rate h and exit
rate q. Then, at the steady state, their employment probability will be:
e =
h
h+ q
We can compare the average employment rate observed in the data and the steady-
state rate based on the average values of the hiring and exit rates. In the majority
group, the employment rate is equal to 87% while the steady-state rate would be
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Figure 6: Hiring rate h (left) and exit rate q (right) as a function of the employment
score
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: The employability score is based on the estimation of a logit on the majority
population. The hiring and exit probabilities in the minority group are smoothed using
cubic splines with 4 degrees of freedom.
88% (based on an average hiring rate equal to 0.198 and an average exit rate equal
to 0.027). In the minority group, the employment rate is equal to 64% while the
steady-state rate would be 65% (based on an average hiring rate equal to 0.125
and an average exit rate equal to 0.067). Interestingly, the employment rates in
the data are really close to the steady-state values predicted using the hiring and
exit rates.
Now, we disentangle the contribution of inflows and outflows to the total ethnic
employment gap by a simple counterfactual exercise. Keeping the hiring rate at
the level of the majority group and plugging the minority exit rate leads to a
counterfactual steady-state employment rate of 75%, 14 percentage points lower
than the steady-state employment rate in the majority. Conversely, keeping the
exit rate of the majority group and plugging the minority hiring rate leads to a
counterfactual rate of 82%, only 6 percentage points less than the steady-state
rate in the majority. The ethnic differentials in exit rates seem to explain a larger
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Figure 7: Hiring rate h (left) and exit rate q (right) as a function of the employment
score: majority hiring rate deflated by 50% and majority exit rate inflated by 60%
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Notes: Employability is based on the estimation of a logit on the majority population.
The hiring and exit probabilities in the minority group are smoothed using cubic splines
with 4 degrees of freedom.
part of the raw employment gap than those in hiring rates.
Finally, we can perform the same counterfactual exercise conditional on employa-
bility. Figure 8 shows the predicted steady-state employment probability h/(q+h)
at each level of employability, isolating the contributions of the hiring and of the
exit rates. Both differentials in hiring and exit rates seem to importantly con-
tribute to the employment gap at each level of employability. Exit rates seem to
contribute a little more for higher levels of employability whereas gaps in hiring
rates contribute more for lower levels. As 90% of the minority workers have an
employability score above .6 (see Figure 8), differentials in exit rates are, for most
of workers, more important than differentials in hiring rates to explain ethnic
employment gaps (Finding 4).
4.4 Summary of the empirical findings
Our empirical analysis leads to the following main findings:
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Figure 8: Steady-state employment probability as a function of the employability
score
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Notes: The employability score is based on the estimation of a logit on the majority
population. The steady-state employment probabilities in the minority group are com-
puted mixing the values of the hiring and exit rates in both groups, for each level of
employability, before being smoothed using cubic splines with 4 degrees of freedom.
1. The employment gap tends to decrease with employability, especially for
workers above the median of employability (Finding 1).
2. Hiring rates are increasing with employability. The ethnic differential in
hiring rates is around 5 percentage points and the ratio between the majority
and the minority rates is roughly constant with employability, around 1.6
(Finding 2).
3. Exit rates are decreasing with employability. The ethnic differential in exit
rates is around 5 percentage points and the ratio between the minority and
the majority rates is constant with employability, around 1.5 (Finding 3).
4. While both the ethnic differentials in hiring and exit rates play a role in
explaining the employment gap, differentials in exit rates seem to matter
more, for most of workers (Finding 4).
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5 Interpretation
In this section, we interpret our empirical results in light of theoretical models.
First, we develop the inflow-outflow model evoked above to show that the hetero-
geneity of the employment gap is compatible with a very simple model in which
the underlying process generating the differences between groups is homogeneous
(Findings 1, 2 and 3). Second, we investigate whether, if one was ready to
interpret the unexplained employment gaps as the result of hiring discrimination,
Findings 1 and 2 could be helpful to learn about the type of discrimination.
Third, we present two simple theoretical frameworks to explain how ethnic gaps
in exit rates (Findings 3 and 4) can be generated.
5.1 Constant ratios of flow rates lead to heterogeneous
employment gaps
Using the same inflow-outflow model as before, we can combine the following two
equations,
eF =
hF
qF + hF
and eD =
hD
qD + hD
leading to a relationship between the steady-state employment rate in the minority
group and (steady-state) employability:
eD =
1
1 + qD
qF
hF
hD
(
1
eF
− 1
) .
As discussed above, our data are consistent with the fact that ratios qD
qF
and
hF
hD
are roughly constant. Constant ratios in inflow and outflow rates, lead to a
simplified form for the relationship between the minority employment rate and
their employability:
eD =
1
1 + α
(
1
eF
− 1
)
where the parameter α, according to our rough estimates based on the curves,
would be around 2.4.
We can perform a more formal test of α being constant. Without loss of gen-
erality, we can rewrite eF (x) =
1
1+exp(ρ(x))
where x denotes the linear index of
characteristics and ρ(x) = log(hF/qF ), and eD(x) =
1
1+exp(ρ(x)+ζ(x))
where ζ(x) =
log(hD/qDqF/hF ). Exploiting the logit form of these expressions, we estimate
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P [Yi = 1|Xi, Ti] = Λ(XiβF + (XiβD)1{Ti = D}). In this model ζ (or equivalently
α) being constant corresponds to βD−0 = 0 (constant excluded). We perform a LR
test of this condition and find a p-value of .09 meaning that the null hypothesis
of a constant α cannot be rejected at a conventional level.
While this framework is silent about the mechanisms that generate the differences
between minority and majority groups in terms of hiring and exit rates, it is useful
to understand that homogeneous mechanisms (i.e. leading to constant ratios) are
empirically consistent with heterogeneous employment rates along the employa-
bility score (Figure 9). In other terms, even if high-skill minority workers face the
same amount of hiring discrimination as low-skill ones, as measured by hD/hF ,
the resulting employment gap will be ultimately lower for the former than for the
latter. In this framework, Findings 1, 2 and 3 are consistent with each other.
The rest of this section is more prospective. We derive simple setups in which
different types of discrimination are at stake in order to compare their predictions
to our empirical findings. Our ambition is not to provide statistical tests about
discrimination type but only to illustrate our empirical findings.
5.2 What can we learn about the type of hiring discrimi-
nation from our empirical findings?
Our main insight regarding the type of discrimination comes from a screening
framework at the hiring stage that leads to predictions on the hiring rates ratio
hD/hF as a function of the employability score eF .
In this framework, productivity is only partially observed and the screening mech-
anism goes as follows. A worker belonging to group T = D,F , has quality y,
and x = E(y|X) sums up the information on quality provided by his observable
characteristics. x is observed both by the econometrician and employers. y can be
rewritten as y = x+ ε, where ε is the unobservable part of quality and is assumed
to be normally distributed as a N (0, ω2) in both groups. When employers screen
applicants for a given job, they observe a signal ε˜ = ε + η. η is a screening error
assumed to be independent of ε and its distribution is assumed to depend on the
worker’s group. The screening error is distributed as a N (0, σ2F ) in group F and
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Figure 9: Constant ratio of inflow/outflow rates and the heterogeneity of the
ethnic employment gap
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Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: Predicted employment probabilities are based on the estimation of a logit on the
majority population. The employment probability in the minority group is smoothed
using cubic splines with 7 degrees of freedom. The dotted line corresponds to the
equation:
eD =
1
1 + α
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) with α = 2.4
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a N (−µ, σ2D) in group D. Based on the observation of x, T and ε˜, risk-neutral
employers formulate the best guess for an applicant’s quality (see proof A.2 in
Appendix):
yˆT (x)
.
= E[y|x, T, ε˜] = x+ ε˜
(
ω2
σ2T + ω
2
)
If µ > 0, employers make a systematic error on the assessment of the productivity
of minority workers (which is only plausible if, at the equilibrium, they do not have
the opportunity to refine this prior very often). This is a simple case of statistical
discrimination, which we call hereafter statistical discrimination in means. The
distribution of η depends on the group T and we assume that σD > σF . For in-
stance, this will be the case if the screening process is less precise for minority than
for majority applicants because employers mainly belong to the majority group.
σD > σF thus generates statistical discrimination in variances. With either µ > 0
or σD > σF , minority workers will pass the cut less often than the ones from the
majority.
We assume that employers are willing to hire all job seekers whose expected pro-
ductivity is above a given threshold c, which we assume to be constant with x
for simplicity. In this framework, taste-based discrimination can be modelled as
a utility loss δ for employers. They require therefore a threshold cD for minority
applicants, which is higher than c and determined by:
E(yˆ|yˆ > cD, x)− E(yˆ|yˆ > c, x) = δ
Considering separately each of the three discrimination mechanisms, we obtain
theoretical predictions about how the ratio of the hiring rates hD/hF varies with
x, (see proofs A.3-A.6 in Appendix).
1. Taste-based discrimination or statistical discrimination in means.
If σD = σF = σ and either δ > 0 or µ > 0 then hD/hF increases with x.
2. Pure statistical discrimination in variances. If δ = 0, µ = 0 and
σD/σF is constant with x, hD/hF increases in x up to a certain threshold
and decreases with x above.
3. Productivity and employability. If q is constant or decreases in x, then
the employment probability eF increases in x
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The first two results provide predictions about how hD/hF varies with observable
productivity, under the polar cases of pure taste-based or statistical discrimina-
tion. The third result shows that these relationships hold when employability is
used instead of productivity.
Many papers in the literature assume that the screening process is likely to be
more efficient as the skill level of the worker increases (see Arcidiacono, Bayer,
and Hizmo, 2010 or Lang and Manove, 2011), so that both σF and σD would
decrease with x. To avoid any strong stance on how the ratio should vary with
x, we assume, for the second result, that σD/σF is constant with x but have to
acknowledge that the empirical literature is silent about this, so far.
Our first theoretical prediction states that in simple models of taste-based dis-
crimination or statistical discrimination on the means, the hiring ratio hD/hF
should be increasing. The second one states that in a simple statistical discrimi-
nation framework in which the variance of the signal differ across ethnic groups,
this same ratio should increase at lower levels of x and decrease above a certain
threshold. While our empirical result do not allow us to exclude any of these two
patterns, we note that the point estimates of the hiring rates are compatible with
the increasing-then-decreasing-ratio story.
This exercise should not be taken as formal evidence in favor of statistical dis-
crimination on the signalling variance, as it is probably possible to construct other
models of discrimination that would lead to different predictions in terms of how
the ratio varies with productivity. However, we think that it is illustrative of the
fact that studying the heterogeneity of labor-market differentials might provide
additional testable predictions about the mechanisms underlying discrimination.
5.3 Micro-founding the ethnic gap in exit rates
In this section, we review two theoretical frameworks that may help explain dif-
ferentials in exit rates (Finding 3).
23
5.3.1 Two-stage screening model
Here, we explicitly model the destruction of the job match in the screening model
developped above. It is usual in the matching literature to endogenize the timing
of the match destruction by assuming that the productivity varies according to
some random process and that the match does not survive under a certain thresh-
old. If productivity is perfectly observed, an obvious modeling choice is to have
the random process depend on ethnicity. More interestingly, when productivity
is not perfectly observed and employers learn about employees over time, new
information about the worker’s productivity can lead to a dismissal. As minority
workers’ initial signals are more noisy, new signals are more likely to reveal very
low productivity. Therefore, the revelation of information about productivity can
result in a higher termination rate for minority workers.
To understand under which conditions this may happen, we add a second stage
to the screening framework in which a new signal is drawn. After a given period
of time, which may depend across matches, employers observe a second draw of ε.
This draw is used to refine their prior about the worker’s quality and may reveal
that some of the workers are not qualified enough for the job. Workers whose
revised expected quality do not meet the new threshold are dismissed.
In the presence of statistical discrimination, minority workers are more often mis-
classified than majority workers. Thus, the exit rate of minority workers will be
higher than the one of majority workers. In the presence of taste-based discrimi-
nation (without statistical discrimination), misclassification is comparable across
groups and there should be no difference in the exit rates of minority and majority
workers (see proof A.7 in Appendix). The ethnic gap in the exit rates observed
in that data (Finding 3) would lead us to favor that statistical discrimination
rather than taste-based discrimination only is involved in the employers’ hiring
behaviors.
5.3.2 Search model with risk aversion
Ethnic exit rate gaps also appear in frameworks with worker risk aversion. Indeed,
one of the most obvious reasons why minority workers would face a higher exit
rate is that they have more insecure jobs, which will have on average shorter dura-
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tions. If workers are risk-averse, the uncertainty about the duration of the job is a
dimension that workers will trade off with wages. Workers that are discriminated
against may have a higher probability to accept a job with a lower wage but also
a job of shorter duration.
In the usual job-search model, workers are risk neutral and their exit rate is exoge-
nous. Introducing variable exit rates across jobs would leave the job-acceptance
behavior unchanged in that framework. Therefore, we introduce risk aversion in
the search model, and following Pratt (1964); Pissarides (1974); Nachman (1975),
we model it in a simple way by introducing a risk-premium term p(q) (increasing
in q).13 Denoting wages as w, the discount rate as r, the present expected utility
associated to a job as Ve and the present expected utility associated to unemploy-
ment as Vu, the flow of utility of a worker in a job with wage w and exit rate q
will be equal to:
rVe(w, q) = w − p(q) + q(Vu − Ve(w, q))
In this context, we can define a reservation utility, and job seekers will only take
offers such w − p(q) > rVu. Assume that the minority population faces a lower
arrival rate of job offers, the minority workers will accept, on average, jobs with a
higher exit rate, even if they face the same distribution of wage and exit rate offers.
In this framework, the differences in exit rates come directly from the differences
in the hiring rates.
6 Concluding comments
In this paper, we describe the heterogeneity of ethnic employment gaps along a
continuous dimension: employability, that measures the counterfactual employ-
ment probability minority workers would have if their observable skills, namely
education and age, were priced as the majority workers’ ones. Under a classical
conditional independence assumption, our empirical strategy enables us to docu-
ment unexplained (net-of-composition-effects) ethnic employment gaps along the
employability score. We apply this method to the ethnic employment gap concern-
ing French men of North African origin. We find that minority workers with lower
13p(q) can have a broader sense than just a risk premium and can be seen as a general cost
of insecurity. Having a less secure job can have actual consequences: more difficulty to rent a
property or to get a loan.
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employability suffer from large unexplained gaps, around 20 percentage points.
The unexplained gap decreases unambiguously with employability, to be lower
than 5 percentage points at the highest employability scores.
A second empirical contribution is to decompose quarterly transition rates into and
from employment: we document how they vary with employability and whether
entry or exit matter most to explain employment gaps. We find that, in both
groups, hiring rates increase with employability while exit rates decrease with em-
ployability. The ratio between the minority and the majority exit rates is clearly
constant along the employability score, whereas point estimates for the ratio of
hiring rates suggest that it increases for low levels of employability and then de-
creases for higher ones but we cannot statistically reject that the ratio is in fact
constant. Finally, we find that ethnic differentials both in hiring and in exit rates
matter for employment gaps, but exit differentials seem to matter more for most
of workers.
Simple labor-market models can be used to provide a first interpretation of these
results. First, we show that the heterogeneity of the employment gaps do not need
to come from heterogenous mechanisms, say, differential discrimination, which
would be harsher towards low-employability than high-employability workers. We
can generate the pattern of the heterogeneity through a simple inflow-outflow
framework in which the ratio of hiring and exit rates are constant. This would
for instance be the case if minority workers received say half as many offers as the
majority ones.
Then, we investigate whether the new empirical results on the hiring and exit
rates can help separate the different sources of discrimination. In a simple screen-
ing framework at the hiring stage, we compare the predictions that arise when we
introduce statistical or taste-based discrimination. Neither the precision of our
empirical results nor the simplicity of our theoretical framework allow us to draw
definite conclusions. However, we note that the predictions given by this sim-
ple model with statistical discrimination (on the variance of the screening error)
matches our point estimates for the pattern of the ratio of hiring rates across eth-
nic groups, which is increasing then decreasing with employability. More research
would be needed to assess the validity of the assumptions of the model and to
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obtain more precise empirical estimates.
Finally, we provide two simple frameworks to understand ethnic gaps in exit rates,
which have not attracted a lot of attention in the literature about ethnic labor-
market gaps. We show that differentials in exit rates can be the consequence
of noisier signals for minority workers at the hiring stage (compatible with the
existence of statistical discrimination). In a search model, the combination of
workers’ risk aversion and discrimination at the hiring stage can also generate
gaps in exit rates when workers self-select into jobs that have a higher probability
to be destroyed.
Compliance with Ethical Standards: The authors declare that they have no con-
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Men
France North Africa
Education
Medicine doctorate 0.01 0.00
University (general): Master deg. and above 0.04 0.02
Grandes Ecoles (general): Master deg. 0.05 0.02
University (general): Bachelor’s deg. (4 years after HS), Science or Industry 0.01 0.00
University (general): Bachelor’s deg. (4 years after HS), Other 0.02 0.01
University (general): Bachelor’s deg. (3 years after HS), Science or Industry 0.01 0.01
University (general): Bachelor’s deg. (3 years after HS), Other 0.02 0.02
University (general): Short-cycle Tertiary Education (2 years after HS) 0.01 0.01
Technical: Short-cycle Tertiary Education (2 years after HS), Industry 0.06 0.03
Technical: Short-cycle Tertiary Education (2 years after HS), Other 0.05 0.04
Health (vocational): Short-cycle Tertiary Education (2 years after HS) 0.01 0.00
High School (general): Upper Secondary Education , Science 0.03 0.02
High School (general): Upper Secondary Education, Humanities 0.03 0.04
High School (technical): Upper Secondary Education, Industry 0.02 0.01
High School (technical): Upper Secondary Education, other 0.02 0.03
High School (vocational): Upper Secondary Education, Industry 0.07 0.05
High School (vocational): Upper Secondary Education, other 0.02 0.03
Basic (vocational): Lower Secondary Education, (apprenticeship), Industry 0.20 0.14
Basic (vocational): Lower Secondary Education, (school), Industry 0.06 0.04
Basic (vocational): Lower Secondary Education, (apprenticeship), other 0.03 0.04
Basic (vocational): Lower Secondary Education, (school), other 0.01 0.02
Basic (general): Lower Secondary Education deg. 0.07 0.10
No diploma 0.15 0.29
Age
15-25 0.17 0.24
25-30 0.16 0.25
30-35 0.16 0.20
35-40 0.17 0.15
40-45 0.17 0.10
45-50 0.18 0.06
Labor Market Situation
Employed 0.87 0.64
Full-time when employed 0.95 0.92
Occupation (current or last if not employed)
Executive, Professional 0.16 0.07
Technical, Education 0.21 0.16
Clerical, Sales, Service Worker 0.13 0.16
Factory Operator 0.36 0.39
Never worked 0.07 0.18
Socio-demographic
Couple 0.75 0.70
Working spouse 0.48 0.23
No child 0.51 0.54
1 child 0.21 0.20
2 children 0.20 0.17
3+ children 0.08 0.09
Youngest child less than 3 0.13 0.16
Mother’s occupation
Unknown 0.02 0.02
Cultivator 0.05 0.00
Retail, Craft 0.04 0.01
Professionals 0.03 0.01
Technicians 0.12 0.03
Office workers 0.32 0.23
Blue workers 0.10 0.08
Does not work 0.32 0.62
Father’s occupation
Unknown 0.05 0.08
Cultivator 0.07 0.00
Retail, Craft 0.11 0.08
Professionals 0.11 0.02
Technicians 0.16 0.05
Office workers 0.11 0.06
Blue workers 0.38 0.66
Does not work 0.02 0.05
Nobs 79,055 3626
Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: 7% of French men whose parents were both born French never worked, while it
is the case for 18% of French men who were born in France and for whom at least one
parent had the citizenship of a North African country at birth.
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Table 2: Employment Logit estimation
Education. Ref: Upper Sec. Education, Humanities Age. Ref: 40-45
Master degree and above 1.39
(0.39)
∗∗∗ 15-25 −1.19
(0.14)
∗∗∗
Medicine doctorate 0.41
(0.11)
∗∗∗ 25-30 −0.64
(0.14)
∗∗∗
Grandes Ecoles: Master deg. 0.77
(0.12)
∗∗∗ 30-35 −0.28
(0.14)
∗∗
Bachelor’s deg. (4 years after HS), Science or Industry 1.16
(0.32)
∗∗∗ 35-40 −0.13
(0.04)
∗∗∗
Bachelor’s deg. (4 years after HS), Other 0.29
(0.14)
∗∗ 45-50 −0.03
(0.04)
Bachelor’s deg. (3 years after HS), Science or Industry 1.06
(0.19)
∗∗∗ Mother’s occupation. Ref: Blue-collar
Bachelor’s deg. (3 years after HS), Other 0.24
(0.12)
∗∗ Unknown −0.25
(0.06)
∗∗∗
Short-cycle Tertiary Ed. (2 years after HS) 0.14
(0.16)
Cultivator 0.46
(0.11)
∗∗∗
Tec. Short-cycle Ter. Ed. (2 years after HS), Ind. 0.74
(0.11)
∗∗∗ Retail, Craft 0.19
(0.06)
∗∗∗
Tec. Short-cycle Ter. Ed. (2 years after HS), Other 0.39
(0.10)
∗∗∗ Professional −0.08
(0.06)
Short-cycle Ter. Ed. (2 years after HS), Health 1.58
(0.33)
∗∗∗ Technician −0.09
(0.04)
∗∗
Upper Sec. Ed., Science 0.19
(0.11)
∗ Office Worker −0.03
(0.05)
Upper Sec. Ed., Industry 0.28
(0.12)
∗∗ Does not work −0.58
(0.08)
∗∗∗
Tec. Up. Sec. Ed., Other −0.10
(0.11)
35-50 * Unknown 0.06
(0.10)
Voc. Up. Sec. Ed., Industry 0.82
(0.10)
∗∗∗ 35-50 * Cultivator 0.14
(0.16)
Voc. Up. Sec. Ed., Other −0.07
(0.11)
35-50 * Retail, Craft −0.02
(0.09)
Voc. Lo. Sec. Ed., (appr.), Ind. 0.19
(0.08)
∗∗ 35-50 * Professional −0.08
(0.09)
Voc. Lo. Sec. Ed., (school), Ind. 0.13
(0.10)
35-50 * Technician 0.10
(0.07)
Voc. Lo. Sec. Ed., (appr.), Other −0.13
(0.11)
35-50 * Office Worker 0.03
(0.08)
Voc. Lo. Sec. Ed., (school), Other −0.37
(0.14)
∗∗∗ 35-50 * Does not work 0.33
(0.16)
∗∗
Lower Sec. Ed. −0.44
(0.08)
∗∗∗ Father’s occupation. Ref: Blue-collar
No diploma −1.06
(0.08)
∗∗∗ Unknown 0.02
(0.11)
35-50 * Upper Sec. Ed., Humanities −0.08
(0.13)
Cultivator 0.14
(0.15)
35-50 * Master deg. 0.08
(0.52)
Retail, Craft −0.04
(0.09)
35-50 * Medicine doctorate 0.43
(0.16)
∗∗∗ Professional −0.10
(0.09)
35-50 * Grandes Ecoles: Master deg. −0.10
(0.14)
Technician −0.13
(0.06)
∗∗
35-50 * Bachelor’s deg. (4 ys after HS), Sc. or Ind. 0.06
(0.50)
Office Worker 0.02
(0.05)
35-50 * Bachelor’s deg. (4 ys after HS), Other 0.46
(0.21)
∗∗ Does not work −0.29
(0.05)
∗∗∗
35-50 * Bachelor’s deg. (3 ys after HS), Sc. or Ind. 0.27
(0.45)
35-50 * Unknown −0.21
(0.17)
35-50 * Bachelor’s deg. (3 ys after HS), Other −0.11
(0.17)
35-50 * Cultivator −0.01
(0.20)
35-50 * Short-cycle Ter. Ed. (2 ys after HS) −0.05
(0.21)
35-50 * Retail, Craft −0.00
(0.14)
35-50 * Tec. Sh.-cyc. Ter. Ed. (2 ys after HS), Ind. 0.14
(0.14)
35-50 * Professional −0.28
(0.17)
∗
35-50 * Tec. Sh.-cyc. Ter. Ed. (2 ys after HS), Oth. 0.05
(0.13)
35-50 * Technician 0.03
(0.10)
35-50 * Short-cycle Ter. Ed. (2 ys after HS), Health −0.33
(0.47)
35-50 * Office Worker 0.06
(0.08)
35-50 * Upper Sec. Ed., Sc. −0.10
(0.16)
35-50 * Does not work 0.28
(0.08)
∗∗∗
35-50 * Tec. Up. Sec. Ed., Ind. 0.19
(0.19)
35-50 * Tec. Up. Sec. Ed., Oth. 0.20
(0.18)
35-50 * Voc. Up. Sec. Ed., Ind. −0.19
(0.14)
35-50 * Voc. Up. Sec. Ed., Oth. 0.15
(0.19)
35-50 * Voc. Lo. Sec. Ed. (appr.) , Ind. −0.23
(0.07)
∗∗∗
35-50 * Voc. Lo. Sec. Ed. (school), Ind. −0.09
(0.11)
35-50 * Voc. Lo. Sec. Ed. (appr.), Oth. −0.01
(0.13)
35-50 * Voc. Lo. Sec. Ed. (school), Oth. 0.14
(0.19)
N 79,055
Source: Labor Force Survey 2005-2011 (INSEE).
Notes: Dummies for calendar quarters (27 without the reference) interacted with dum-
mies for age lower than and greater than 35 are also included in the model but their co-
efficients are omitted for readibility. * means 10%-significant, ** means 5%-significant
and *** means 1%-significant. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Consequence of the CIA: Y (F ) ⊥ T |p(X)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove that:
Yi(F ) ⊥ Ti|Xi, ∀i⇒ Yi(F ) ⊥ Ti|P (Ti = 1|Xi), ∀i.
Following exactly their reasoning, it is possible to prove that, for any random
variables Ai, Bi taking values in {0, 1}:
Ai ⊥ Bi|Xi, ∀i⇒ Ai ⊥ Bi|P (Ai = 1|Xi), ∀i.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) consider Ai = Ti and Bi = Yi(F ). The proof finishes
by taking Ai = Yi(F ) and Bi = Ti.
A.2 Employer’s best guess: yˆT (x)
.
= E[y|y˜, x, T ] = x+ε˜
(
ω2
σ2T+ω
2
)
This point is derived from Aigner and Cain (1977). Employers’ best guess, given
x, T and y˜ is:
yˆT (x) = E[y|y˜, x, T ] = E[x+ ε|ε+ η, x, T ] = x+ E[ε|ε+ η, T ]
The last equality holding because x ⊥ ε.
The result follows then from:
E[ε|ε+ η, T ] = ω
2
ω2 + σ2T
(ε+ η) =
ω2
ω2 + σ2T
(y˜ − x)
This equation implies that yˆT (x) ∼ N(x, ω4/(σ2T + ω2)).
A.3 Point 1, Section 5, taste-based discrimination
To offset a utility loss δ, employers set up a cutoff cD > c such that:
E(yˆ|yˆ > cD, x)− E(yˆ|yˆ > c, x) = δ
Condition yˆ > γ, (γ = c, or γ = cD) is equivalent to:
√
σ2 + ω2
ω2
(yˆ − x) >
√
σ2 + ω2
ω2
(γ − x)
We define c = (c− x)
√
ω2+σ2
ω2
, cD = (cD − x)
√
ω2+σ2
ω2
, u = (yˆ − x)
√
ω2+σ2
ω2
∼ N (0, 1)
and we denote λ(.) = ϕ(.)/Φ(.), with ϕ and Φ corresponding respectively to the
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probability distribution function and the cumulative distribution function of a
N (0, 1). With these notations E(u|u > γ, x) = λ(γ).
The thresholds c and cD are such that:
λ(−cD)− λ(−c) = δ
√
σ2 + ω2
ω2
.
= δ˜
If δ does not depend on x, differentiating this equation with respect to x leads to:
−c′D(x)λ′(−cD(x)) = −c′(x)λ′(−c(x)) (1)
Given that λ′/λ is decreasing and that cD > c, we have that:
λ′(−cD)
λ(−cD) >
λ′(−c)
λ(−c) (2)
Combining equations (1) and (2), and given that λ′ < 0, we obtain:
λ(−cD)(−c′D(x)) > λ(−c)(−c′(x)) (3)
The ratio of hiring probabilities is equal to:
hD
hF
=
P (u > cD)
P (u > c)
=
Φ(−cD)
Φ(−c)
Differentiating the ratio of employment probabilities by x, we show that the sign
of the derivative is the same as the one of:
λ(−cD)(−c′D(x))− λ(−c)(−c′(x))
From equation (3), we find that the ratio hD/hF should be increasing.
A.4 Point 1, Section 5, statistical discrimination in means
In this case, yˆD = yˆF = x+ ε˜
ω2
σ2+ω2
. Condition yˆ > c is equivalent to:
√
σ2 + ω2
ω2
(yˆ − x) >
√
σ2 + ω2
ω2
(c− x)
We define c = (c − x)
√
ω2+σ2
ω2
. In this case, transformed unobservables u =
(yˆ − x)
√
ω2+σ2
ω2
are distributed in a N (0, 1) in group F and N (−µ, 1) in group
D. We denote λ(.) = ϕ(.)/Φ(.), with ϕ and Φ corresponding to the probability
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distribution function and the cumulative distribution function of a N (0, 1).
Then:
hD
hF
=
P (uD > c(x))
P (uF > c(x))
=
Φ(−c(x)− µ)
Φ(−c(x))
Differentiating the ratio of employment probabilities by x, and using that c′ < 0,
we find that the sign of the derivative is the same as the one of:
λ(−c(x)− µ)− λ(−c)
Because −c(x)− µ < −c(x), and λ′ < 0, we have λ(−c(x)− µ) > λ(−c), so that
the ratio hD/hF is increasing.
A.5 Point 2, Section 5
Condition yˆT > c is equivalent to:√
σ2T + ω
2
ω2
(yˆT − x) >
√
σ2T + ω
2
ω2
(c− x)
or, denoting uT =
√
σ2T+ω
2
ω2
(yˆT − x), with T = D,F , c(x) =
√
σ2F+ω
2
ω2
(c − x) and
k =
√
σ2D+ω
2√
σ2F+ω
2
> 1, so that hF = P (uF > c) and hD = P (uD > kc).
Because uD and uF ∼ N (0, 1),
hD
hF
=
P (uD > kc(x))
P (uF > c(x))
=
Φ(−kc(x))
Φ(−c(x))
First consider the situation when σD and σF do not vary with x. The derivative
of hD
hF
with respect to x is positive iff:
Φ(−kc(x))ϕ(−c(x))c′(x) > kΦ(−c(x))ϕ(−kc(x))c′(x)
and as c′(x) = −
√
σ2F+ω
2
ω2
< 0, this is equivalent to:
Φ(−kc(x))ϕ(−c(x)) < kΦ(−c(x))ϕ(−kc(x))
Noting λ(.) = ϕ(.)/Φ(.), this is itself equivalent to:
λ(−c(x)) < kλ(−kc(x))
If c > 0, that is x < c, we have as k > 1, −kc(x) < −c(x), and as λ(.) is positive
and decreasing, λ(−c(x)) < kλ(−kc(x)). Therefore, hD
hF
is increasing in x.
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If c < 0, that is if x > c, conclusion depends on the value of k: hD
hF
increases in
x iff λ(−c(x)) < kλ(−kc(x)) and hD
hF
decreases in x iff λ(−c(x)) > kλ(−kc(x)).
Simulations show that ∀k > 1 there exists a (unique) −c0 such that ∀ − c <
−c0, λ(−c(x)) < kλ(−kc(x)) and ∀− c > −c0, λ(−c(x)) > kλ(−kc(x)) (more
details available upon request). So, hD
hF
increases with x up to a certain threshold
and then decreases. The threshold depends on the employer cut-off c and on the
screening error variance ratio k.
A.6 Point 3, Section 5
Consider the inflow-outflow equation with e, h and q being functions of x:
e(x) =
h(x)
h(x) + q(x)
.
Taking the derivative with respect to x leads to:
e′(x) =
h′(x)q(x)− q′(x)h(x)
(h(x) + q(x))2
with the previous notations, h(x) = P (u > c(x)) = Φ(−c(x)) which is increasing
in x. Therefore, it suffices for e to be increasing in x, that q be non increasing in
x.
A.7 Two-stage screening model
The two-stage screening model corresponds to drawing u1, u2 in a bivariate normal
distribution such that u1, u2 ∼ N (0, 1) and cov(u1, u2) = ρT = ω2ω2+σ2T .
Writing u2 = ρTu1 + ν, with V (ν) =
√
1− ρ2T leads to
P (u2 > c|u1 > c) =
P
(
ν√
1−ρ2T
> c−ρTu1√
1−ρ2T
& u1 > c
)
P (u1 > c)
.
With the previous notations, it follows that:
P (u2 > c|u1 > c) =
∫∞
c
Φ
(
ρTu−c√
1−ρ2T
)
ϕ(u)
Φ(−c) .
The denominator does not depend on ρT , and
ρTu−c√
1−ρ2T
is increasing in ρT as long
as u > ρT c (which is the case here). P (u2 > c|u1 > c) is thus increasing in ρT ,
and therefore decreasing in σT . Minority workers are more likely to be dismissed
than majority ones.
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B Appendix: Similarities and differences between
the propensity and employability scores
The employability score shares similarities with the propensity score but it dif-
fers from it. Note first that the employability score is not a balancing score in
the sense defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). In general, we do not have
X ⊥ T |p(X). To see this, just consider two populations T = 0 and T = 1, and
a unique explanatory variable X with values 0 and 1, and taking value 1 with
probability q if T = 0 and probability 1− q if T = 1 (q 6= 1− q). Assume also that
employment Y is such that P (Y |X,T ) = 1/2 independent of T and X. It follows
that T 6⊥ X|P (Y |X) = 1/2.
Even if the employability score is not a balancing score, Y (F ) ⊥ T |p(X) entails
that conditional treatment effects are identified at any value of p(X). So the em-
ployability score provides a different dimension of analysis that is not redundant
with nor cannot be summarized in general by the propensity score.
Further, applying the same reasoning as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) on p(X)
instead of on the propensity score, we can define balancing scores relative to Y ,
instead of balancing scores relative to T . Let bY be a balancing score relative to
Y , bY is such that X ⊥ Y |bY (X). Theorem 2 of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
says that the propensity score e(X) = P (T = 1|X) is the coarsest balancing score
in the sense that if bT is a balancing score (relative to T ), then e = f(bT ) for some
function f . Considering now Y instead of T , it follows that p(X) = P (Y = 1|X)
is the coarsest balancing score relative to Y .
Theorem 3 of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) says that if treatment assignment is
strongly ignorable given X, then it is strongly ignorable given any balancing score
bT (X), which holds in particular for the propensity score e(X). Considering again
Y instead of T , treatment assignment is also ignorable given any balancing score
relative to Y , bY (X), in particular given the employability p(X).
To justify even more the use of the employability, we show next that it is, with
the propensity score, the only other unidimensional score that could lead to the
previous results in a general way. It may happen, that in specific situations, other
unidimensional scores could summarize the CIA and be good candidates for a
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conditional analysis, but the only ones that can work on a general basis are the
propensity score and the employability. To see that, it is sufficient to find an
example in which they are the only valid scores (in the above sense).
Assume that there is one single covariate X, and that Y is such that P (Y =
1|X) = Λ(X), with Λ(x) = exp(x)/(1 + exp(x)), and T is such that P (T =
1|X) = 1− Λ(X).
Imagine that there is some function g such that Y ⊥ T |g(X) but g is neither a
balancing score relative to Y nor to T : X 6⊥ T |g(X) and X 6⊥ Y |g(X). This
means that there exist x1 < x2, such that g(x1) = g(x2) = γ but P (Y =
1|x1) 6= P (Y = 1|x2). Given the specific form of Y and T , this also means
that P (T = 1|x1) 6= P (T = 1|x2).
Assume without loss of generality that g = γ ⇒ x ∈ (x1, x2) and that X follows
a non informative distribution. It follows that P (Y = 1|T = 0, g = γ) < P (Y =
1|T = 1, g = γ). Indeed, with T = 0, it is more likely that x = x1 than x = x2.
This contradicts the fact that Y ⊥ T |g(X). Therefore, in general, the only scores
b that are such that Y ⊥ T |b(X) are balancing scores relative to Y or T .
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